Central African Republic: Renewed Civil War Looms

February 1, 2010 by Mark Christopher
Filed under Elsewhere in Africa, Genocide, OBS Reports

PHOTO: Central African Republic security forces stand at attention. (Executed Today)

A potential execution of a former defense minister-turned-rebel, rising violence in the northeast, and a severe lack of sustainable aid aimed at building infrastructure are just a few of the many issues facing one of the poorest nations in the world: the Central African Republic (CAR).

Three devastating civil wars within only a 10 year time period has kept much of the CAR from being reconciled into one stable nation. Ethnic issues and cattle rustling, especially in the far north of the country near Chad and Sudan’s genocide-ravaged Darfur region have pushed rebel groups further away from an extremely lengthy, and somewhat effective, peace process.

Meanwhile, south of the capital at Bangui, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels fleeing from a powerful drive by the joint armies of Uganda, southern Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo continue to butcher defenseless civilians, before turning north to enter Sudan’s Darfur region, where recent reports indicate that the LRA is regrouping under the auspices of the Sudanese government.

Despite the gloomy atmosphere of war, intense human rights abuses, and interethnic violence, the CAR has potential to become a small economic powerhouse due to large wealth in gold, uranium, and diamonds. However, the growing political, military, and social crisis facing the CAR threatens to rip apart what little progress has been made over the past few years.

Progress Made Being Unravelled

Despite peace efforts that have had some positive results, several of the above issues are being renewed due to the lack of following through on the government’s part concerning concessions agreed on during the Inclusive Political Dialogue, which witnessed:

the promised integration of rebel leaders into political circles in Bangui
the precedent of decision-making by consensus of the current government and opposition parties
rebel disarmament and security sector reform

But a recent series of events, the latest being President Francois Bozize confirming the death of a rebel leader while in the custody of state security, shows that the peace process is far from complete; and, even more clearly, that the political crisis facing the CAR remains deeply entrenched in both the rebel-held areas and Bangui.

In fact, over the past several months as the peace process has neared stagnation, the government has showed little if no interest in what happens outside of Bangui unless it directly affects the regime.

Regime Refusing to Deal With the Lord’s Resistance Army

President Bozize’s regime has shown more interest in winning upcoming elections than dealing with Lords Resistance Army (LRA) attacks on defenseless villages. The national army has rarely confronted the LRA, and much of the focus remains on keeping a rather unstable balance of power between abusive rebel groups in the north, a crisis which has been further exacerbated by tens of thousands of refugees from Darfur. This point was made clear by a recent report issued by the IRIN:

“As three truck-loads of newly arrived soldiers from the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) drove through Obo, local residents talked with bitterness and resignation about the continuing security problems and inability of either local forces or their allies from the better-equipped Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) to flush out combatants from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).”

While the north is obviously important to national stability, eradicating the LRA must also be a focus, and thus far it has not been. Instead of using the national army, the regime in Bangui has left the local military group Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in charge of combatting LRA fighters. Though better armed than government troops, the UPDF does not have the capacity to defeat the LRA in Central African Republic territory, despite the killing of several LRA leaders by UPDF forces.

The LRA-intiated crisis threatens to create a similar situation to the one in northeastern CAR if it is not dealt with in the near future. As warned in a recent report by the Enough Project about the LRA operating in nearby Democratic Republic of the Congo:

“These recent attacks are especially shocking in their brutality. No longer focused on just stealing food to survive, LRA forces in DRC appear to be attacking in order to terrorize the population and perhaps to send a message to the Congolese authorities who claim the LRA is finished. These ulterior goals may explain why the LRA has returned to using vile practices such as severe mutilations.”

LRA attacks similar to the ones in Congo continue to promote a climate of insecurity and fear among the civilian population, leading civilians into forming armed self-defence groups. Depending on how powerful these groups become, new rebel groups could evolve from them, further deteriorating the situation in CAR as a whole.

Violence on the Rise in Northeastern Region of CAR

The initial peace dialogue between the government and multiple rebel groups operating in the north of the country has been met with mixed results. For now, the northwest region of CAR remains relatively free of military clashes.

However, the volatile northeast of the country remains stricken by war, an influx of refugees from Darfur, and a near failure of an EU/UN peacekeeping containment mission surrounding Darfur. In a recent report by the International Crisis Group, some of these key points were highlighted:

“Bozizé’s show of political openness, however, came to an abrupt end in early 2009. He apparently judged that holding the talks gave him the legitimacy, especially with donors, to choose a new government as loyal as its predecessor and make unilateral changes to the electoral law that favour his re-election. The opposition fought hard during the year to keep the foothold it gained at the dialogue and secure some influence in the Independent Electoral Commission. However, stubbornness on both sides postponed that body’s creation and risked making credible elections in early 2010 a technical impossibility.

The dialogue endorsed a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program for ending the rebellions in the north, but the self-interested demands of rebel leaders have delayed implementation and raised frustration among fighters on the ground. In the north west, clashes are rare but the people still suffer, unable to rebuild their lives. In the north east, the government’s authorisation of Zacharia Damane’s Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement, UFDR) to maintain security has awakened old tribal rivalries and provoked the formation of two new armed groups. Violence is on the rise, as rebels try to bolster their negotiating positions and the government remains set on pursuing a military solution.”

There is also to consider the potential for future attacks on Darfur refugees. The current UN force, dubbed MINURCAT, is deployed in neighboring Chad as well, and with the recent announcement that the Chadian government wants MINURCAT to be withdrawn from it’s territory, it is possible UN troops may be withdrawn from CAR as well. This would leave Darfur refugees largely unprotected from armed groups as well as armed local civilians, who often times rape women who leave refugee camps in search of firewood and clean drinking water.

Despite the recent boost in the UN presence in northeastern CAR, human right’s violations and sporadic multi-sided ethnic cleansing campaigns remain rampant. Much of the violence is a direct result of ethnic issues, cattle rustling, and the growing security vacuum being created by both rebel and government military activity. Current exacerbating factors also include a severe lack of clean water, health/sanitation services, lack of infrastructure and education, and perhaps most importantly, a lack of international attention to the crisis.

Potential Solutions to Build Peace and Security

A boost in security followed by sustainable, infrastructure-building aid is the key to building a lasting peace in the CAR. Included in the report mentioned earlier by the International Crisis Group are some recommendations that point the peace process in the right direction:

To make the most of what the Inclusive Political Dialogue achieved, the government and its foreign partners should thus concentrate on the following priorities:

The priority over the first months of 2010 should be the consensual organisation of credible elections. The Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), government and donors should, therefore, work hard to hold elections in April as planned, but if by March insufficient progress has been made in technical preparations or in improving the security situation, national actors should be prepared to postpone. The government should urgently engage rebels, opposition politicians and civil society to agree by consensus in advance on how to avoid a constitutional and political crisis if a postponement is necessary.

To entrench the practice of political dialogue and decision-making by consensus, Paulin Pomodimo, the former archbishop of Bangui who now heads the National Council for Mediation, should lead efforts to set up a permanent framework for dialogue with the country’s political and social actors that aims to achieve consensus governance before and beyond the elections.

To reduce violence in the north east and create favourable conditions for DDR and elections, the government should quickly open negotiations with the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix, CPJP) rebel group with a view to obtaining its commitment to the peace process. With the support of the UN mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT), the government should also facilitate dialogue between the Gula-dominated UFDR and Ahamat Mustapha’s armed Kara group.

The government and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) should rework plans for reintegrating rebels into civilian life or the armed forces, so that ex-combatants have the opportunity immediately after disarmament to participate in development projects alongside local community members. Rebel leaders, UNDP and the SSR permanent secretariat should agree on the number of ex-combatants to be accepted into the security services.

The government should prepare a second roundtable on SSR, but donors should fund medium-term reforms only if it demonstrates commitment to implementing the already agreed schedule. The CAR will only be able to counter the threat of domestic and foreign armed groups, including the LRA, by deploying a fully professionalised army and extending state institutions across the national territory.

Because accelerated rural development is crucial for alleviating the humanitarian crisis and creating favourable conditions for DDR and elections, the UN Peacebuilding Commission should mobilise donors to put their full support behind the European Commission’s “development poles” program, which aims to stimulate income-generating activities and restore basic infrastructure around provincial towns.

The regular payment of civil servant salaries is one of Bozizé’s strongest sources of popularity in Bangui. Donors should make it clear that they will stop providing the necessary funds for this, unless the government displays clear commitment to creating a security environment conducive to credible elections, including by negotiating with the last remaining rebel group.

If even some of these conditions and suggestions are met by international aid organizations, the government, opposition political groups, the international community, and rebel groups, the concept of a lasting peace in the CAR will be much more reachable and easier to promote. It is also time for activists that focus on defeating the LRA and are concerned about Darfur to pay special attention to the Central African Republic. The CAR remains central to achieving peace for the entire region, and as activists focus on Sudan, Uganda, and Congo there must also be a recognition that CAR is connected and plays a major role in ending the genocide in Darfur, defeating the LRA, and building peace in war-torn Democratic Republic of the Congo.